2024 State of Affairs and the Geopolitical Challenges Shaping 2025
By Vanessa Tomassini for the Italian “Strumenti Politici”.2024 was a year marked by profound geopolitical shifts, directly impacting our security and daily lives. We’ve engaged internationally renowned experts to provide in-depth analyses of some of the most critical issues of our time: Middle East instability, the threat of jihadist terrorism, migration crises, and new geopolitical dynamics in North Africa. Through the insights of Claudio Bertolotti, Naysan Rafati, Lorenzo Vidino, and Michela Mercuri, we explore the root causes of these phenomena, their interconnections, and potential future developments. Their perspectives on the world’s future offer indispensable reading for understanding the challenges ahead and guiding political decision-makers.Recent days have seen the arrest of Italian journalist Cecilia Sala in Tehran spark controversy. Claudio Bertolotti, a research associate and lecturer at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), when asked for a comment, suggested that “Mohamed Abedini, arrested in Malpensa on a US warrant for allegedly providing material support to the Pasdaran through the supply of technological equipment, and awaiting extradition, could be linked to the arrest of the Italian journalist in Tehran.”According to the analyst, “Cecilia Sala may merely be a tool of political pressure, and her journalistic activity, which was authorized by Tehran, is irrelevant.” Bertolotti further suggests that “Iran may view Italy as the weak link in its alliance with the United States, where Washington is untouchable while Rome is vulnerable.” He attributes this to Italy’s lack of a shared strategic vision, arguing that successive governments have governed with a short-term perspective, without a concrete strategy aimed at protecting and pursuing national interests. Unlike major liberal nations like the United States and France, or illiberal and autocratic ones like Russia and China, Italy has failed to conceive, let alone implement, a strategy that can (and should) be shared by the entire political spectrum. This, according to Bertolotti, is due to structural and cultural limitations within the Italian political class.Turning to Iran, it is clear that the Islamic Republic could pose one of the most significant challenges to the West in 2025.
Naysan Rafati, a senior analyst for the Iran program at the International Crisis Group, taking stock of the past twelve months, notes that “Perhaps the most significant geopolitical development for Iran in 2024 was a series of setbacks that sharply weakened its ability to project power and influence in the Levant.” “The Islamic Republic,” adds the expert, “had over many years invested financial and military resources into supporting Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria; the former is now significantly weakened and the latter has collapsed. Meanwhile, it has come off the worse from two unprecedented, direct military exchanges with Israel that exposed its defensive vulnerabilities.” Naysan Rafati further highlights that “Internally, the system continues to face political, social and economic discontent. These challenges on the domestic and regional fronts are likely to remain significant in the year ahead, as are the regime’s relations with the West — especially given the possibility of a more adversarial policy under the Trump administration, the worsening of relations with Europe, and mounting concerns over Iran’s nuclear program”.Another issue that authorities will need to remain vigilant about in 2025 is the threat of terrorism.
Lorenzo Vidino, director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, explains that “with regard to jihadism in 2024, we have not seen a significant escalation. Certainly, in some regions such as Afghanistan, with ISIS-K, and in various parts of Africa, jihadist terrorism remains a constant threat. However, globally, there has not been a substantial increase, as one might expect considering the tensions in the Middle East, particularly in Gaza and Lebanon. Despite the potential for such conflicts to be exploited by jihadist groups, we have not observed a concrete impact at the operational level.” In the West, and specifically in Italy, Professor Vidino highlights how the situation is “characterized by a constant jihadist presence, as police operations in Bologna today confirm. These are often young people radicalized primarily online, often second-generation. However, we have not witnessed large-scale attacks. The most significant threat seems to come from more structured networks like ISIS-K, which has a presence in the West, perhaps not so much in Italy but in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, and could pose a greater risk than lone wolves, or individual radicalized individuals.”Looking ahead to the next year, Lorenzo Vidino expects “a situation similar to that of 2024, where the situation in Syria represents the greatest unknown. It will depend largely on the evolution of the new government and the role of groups like Hay’at Tahrir Al Shams (HTS). If the latter were to definitively distance itself from jihadism, but if parts of Syrian territory were to fall under jihadist influence, this could favor a resurgence of ISIS and increase the threat to the West. In conclusion, although jihadism remains a concrete threat, the current situation seems relatively stable. However, the evolution of conflicts in the Middle East and the internal dynamics of jihadist groups could lead to new developments and require constant attention from the authorities. A scenario is emerging in which strong Islamist groups control territory, such as HTS and the Taliban, and the big question from a Western counterterrorism perspective is whether these groups want to limit themselves to controlling their own territory or also want to host jihadist groups and whether, perhaps in the medium to long term, these same groups want to operate in the West as well.”
2024 was a year full of events that also affected North Africa. Two of these deserve closer analysis according to Michela Mercuri, a professor of geopolitics at the University of Padua and of Middle East geopolitics at the University of Niccolò Cusano. “Firstly,” says Mercuri, “there has been a significant decrease in landings on Italian coasts from the central Mediterranean, particularly from Libya, Tunisia, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. Thanks to the agreements signed between Italy and Tunisia in July 2023, there has been a 60% drop in arrivals. In the last months of the year, the percentage of migrants departing from Tunisian coasts has even decreased by 80% compared to the previous year, highlighting the significant success of Italian policies in this area.” However, as often happens, the closure of one migratory route favors the opening of others. “Departures from the western Mediterranean have increased significantly, with an increase in landings on the Spanish coast, particularly the Canary Islands, and from the eastern Mediterranean, towards the western Balkans. This latter route, although having recorded a 77% decrease, could experience a resurgence following the Syrian crisis, the evolution of which remains uncertain. In anticipation of this eventuality, on December 18, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni met with the leaders of the Western Balkan countries in Brussels to agree on common policies on border security and migration management,” explains the analyst.Faced with these challenges, Mercuri suggests that Italy should “consolidate its role as a hub in North Africa, not only from an energy perspective towards Europe, but also as a reference point for NATO on its southern flank. This objective is in line with the Mattei Plan for Africa, which has already led to the signing of important agreements with several North African countries, including Libya and Tunisia, in the sectors of business, training, agriculture, health, and infrastructure. Secondly, it is essential to strengthen relations with Tunisia, a strategic country both from a migratory and economic point of view. A concrete example is the Elmed project for the electrical interconnection between the two countries. Moreover, Italy’s commitment to welcoming 12,000 trained Tunisians each year represents a model that can be replicated in other contexts.”
Thirdly, Mercuri continues, “Italy should seek to export the Albanian model, that is, a stable and constructive presence to facilitate the reception of migrants in full respect of human rights. Despite the strong presence of Turkey and Russia, Italy can carve out a leading role through the Mattei Plan, promoting business and economic cooperation. Another important challenge is the growing Russian influence in eastern Libya, particularly after the fall of Assad in Syria. Russia’s loss of the Tartus base has pushed Moscow to strengthen its presence in Benghazi, threatening Italian interests and further destabilizing the region. In this context, Italy must strengthen its relations with Turkey, which, although having a complex role in Libya, represents a potential ally in stabilizing the region.”
On this point, Claudio Bertolotti criticizes “Italy’s impotence and lack of assertiveness in the vitally important African continent. On the one hand, the assertiveness of Russia and China in the sub-Saharan and Sahel countries, where they have focused on an intense and prolonged influence operation, without Italy having minimally countered this direct attack on its national interests, has in fact limited, if not precluded, access to primary resources for energy supply and the rare minerals necessary for technological development.”“In this context,” Bertolotti adds, “the worrying and direct threat posed by the increasingly widespread and aggressive Russian presence in Libya (Cyrenaica) is an extremely serious act that does not seem to have aroused the concern of public opinion, parliamentary oppositions, or the government.” The Italian expert also expresses concern about Turkey’s advance: “from Syria to the Horn of Africa to Libya, Turkey’s rise has imposed on Italy a secondary role in what could have been a shared vision and projection led by Rome. But this has not been the case, due to the government’s lack of courage and the blindly ideological and strategically castrating approach of the oppositions. This choice, that of Turkey, unchallenged by Italy, has opened the door to the dangerous expansion of the political Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood linked to jihadism, from Syria to Libya, from al-Qaeda terrorism and the Islamic State (formerly ISIS) merged into the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham supported by Ankara, to Palestinian terrorism embodied by Hamas.”
Claudio Bertolotti is co-founder and executive director of the Observatory on Radicalization and Counterterrorism (ReaCT), a Subject Matter Expert at NATO, and a researcher and lecturer at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and the Italian Society for International Organization (Sioi). Former Italian representative at the 5+5 Defense initiative, with over 20 years of global experience, he served in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo) and Afghanistan as Head of the Counterespionage Section of NATO.
Naysan Rafati is a senior analyst for the Iran program at the International Crisis Group. His research focuses on the Iranian nuclear deal and the Islamic Republic’s regional policies. He joined the organization in October 2017 and is based in Washington. Before joining Crisis Group, Naysan was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations and Security (Tapir) at the Rand Corporation, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Institut français des relations internationales.
Lorenzo Vidino is the director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. An expert on Islamism in Europe and North America, his research over the past 20 years has focused on the dynamics of mobilization of jihadist networks in the West; on government policies to counter radicalization; and on the activities of organizations inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in the West.
Michela Mercuri is a professor of Culture, History, and Society of Muslim Countries at the University of Padua and of Middle East Geopolitics at the University of Niccolò Cusano. She has taught “Contemporary History of Mediterranean Countries” at the University of Macerata from 2006 to 2019 and in various master’s programs at SIOI (Italian Society for International Organizations), the Inter-Forces Intelligence Training Center, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Macerata, the University of Teramo, and various other Italian institutes.